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Digest:  People v. Ceja 
Kelly J. Manley 
Opinion by Corrigan, J., with George, C.J., Kennard, Baxter, 
Werdegar, Chin, and Moreno, JJ. 
Issue 
Should a theft conviction take precedence when a defendant 
is convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property, 
regardless of which offense carries the greater penalty? 
Facts 
Rafael Ceja was convicted of misdemeanor petty theft and 
felony receipt of stolen property, stemming from his arrest on 
June 18, 2006.1  On that date, a police officer, who was 
responding to a report of suspicious behavior, saw two men 
matching the description of the suspects.2  Ceja was carrying a 
speaker box that had been removed from a vehicle nearby.3  Ceja 
was found guilty by a jury on both of the charges.4  He was 
sentenced to two years in prison for the felony of receipt of stolen 
property5 and the court stayed a 180-day jail term for the theft.6 
The Court of Appeal, while acknowledging that theft is not 
necessarily a lesser included offense of receiving stolen property, 
affirmed the conviction for receipt of stolen property and reversed 
the theft conviction.7  The court relied on the rule that, when a 
defendant is convicted on charges that include both a greater and 
lesser included offense, the sentence imposed is only on the 
greater offense.8  The dissent stated that the common law origins 
of the rules for these crimes make clear that once a defendant 
 
 1  People v. Ceja, 229 P.3d 995, 997 (Cal. 2010). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id.  The court dismissed charges of unlawful taking and receiving a stolen vehicle 
due to lack of evidence, and a burglary charge because the vehicle was unlocked. Id. at 
997 n.3. 
 5 The court also added an additional year of prison time for a prior conviction. Id. at 
997. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. (citing People v. Moran, 463 P.2d 763, 767 (Cal. 1970)). 
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has been convicted of theft, there is no basis for a conviction of 
receiving stolen property.9 
Analysis 
The court first looked at the history of the relation between 
receiving stolen property and theft, considering the common law 
notion that it is “logically impossible for a thief who has stolen an 
item of property to buy or receive that property from himself.”10  
The case law showed that there had sometimes been a narrow 
application of the rule, preventing only convictions of the two 
separate offenses, and sometimes a broad application, precluding 
a conviction when there was evidence to incriminate the 
defendant in the theft.11  The broader application led to many 
problems12 and was largely abandoned13 in 1992 when the 
legislature amended the definition of receiving stolen property by 
adding to the statute: “A principle in the actual theft of the 
property may be convicted pursuant to this section.  However, no 
person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the 
theft of the same property.”14  This amendment to Penal Code 
section 496(a) effectively abolished the broad application of the 
common law rule and instead adopted the narrow application, 
barring dual convictions.15  However, the court noted that the 
statute, even with its amendments, was silent on the question 
before it: “[W]hen a defendant has been improperly convicted of 
stealing and receiving the same property, what is the appropriate 
remedy?”16  The court read section 496(a) to be neutral on its 
 
 9 Id. at 997.  The California Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting opinion of 
the Court of Appeal in this case. Id. 
 10 Id. (quoting People v. Allen, 984 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1999)). 
 11 Id. (citing Allen, 984 P.2d at 491). 
 12 Id.  “Among other complications, defendants found room to argue that a conviction 
for receiving stolen property required proof that they did not commit the theft.” Id. at 997 
n.4 (citing Allen, 984 P.2d at 491). 
 13 Id. at 998 (citing Allen, 984 P.2d at 491–94). 
 14 Id. at 997 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a) (West 2010), as amended by Stats. 
1992, ch. 1146, § 1, p. 5374).  Section 496(a) now reads, in relevant part: 
Every person who buys or receives any property that has been 
stolen . . . knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained . . . shall be 
punished by imprisonment . . . .  However, if the district attorney or the grand 
jury determines that this action would be in the interests of justice, 
[either] . . . may . . . specify in the accusatory pleading that the offense shall be 
a misdemeanor . . . .  A principal in the actual theft of the property may be 
convicted pursuant to this section.  However, no person may be convicted both 
pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a). 
 15 Id. at 998 (citing Allen, 984 P.2d at 494). 
 16 Id. at 998. 
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face, allowing either of the two convictions to be permissible, so 
long as only one is allowed to stand.17 
The Attorney General argued that, because the Legislature 
did not indicate a preference for one over the other, the Court of 
Appeal was proper in holding that defendants are liable for the 
greatest offense they commit.18  Considering People v. Medina,19 
the Attorney General referred to the rule that a lesser offense is 
necessarily included in a greater offense when the greater offense 
cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.20  The 
Attorney General also argued as to the applicability of Penal 
Code section 654, which states: “An act or omission that is 
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall 
be punished under the provision that provides for the longest 
potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or 
omission be punished under more than one provision.”21 
Though the court noted that the Attorney General’s 
arguments were “superficially appealing,” it ultimately found 
that they did not hold up to a more thorough assessment of the 
law.22  The court found that there were considerable distinctions 
between the rule against multiple convictions based on greater 
and lesser included offenses, and those against dual convictions 
of theft and receiving stolen property.23  The court stated that the 
amendments to section 496(a) make clear that regardless of 
which offense carries a greater penalty, a theft conviction will 
always take precedence.24  Section 654 does not affect the 
outcome of such a case because it applies not to convictions, but 
only to sentencing.25 
The court looked at the analogy of greater and lesser 
included offenses, which the Court of Appeal found persuasive.26  
It is generally understood that it is impermissible to convict on a 
greater and a lesser included offense because a defendant cannot 
commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser 
offense; allowing convictions on both counts would effectively 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 People v. Medina, 161 P.3d 187, 196 (Cal. 2007). 
 20 Ceja, 229 P.3d at 998 (citing Medina, 161 P.3d at 196). 
 21 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 2010)). 
 22 Id. at 998. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id.  The court noted that some cases have confused section 654’s bar against 
multiple sentences with the rule against convictions for stealing and receiving stolen 
property, but this court has consistently rejected the proposition to fuse the two rules. Id. 
 26 Id. 
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convict the defendant twice for the lesser offense.27  The Court of 
Appeal noted that theft is not a lesser included offense of 
receiving stolen property28 but failed to recognize that the rule 
against a conviction on both theft and receiving stolen property 
does not have anything to do with a defendant potentially 
receiving a double punishment.29  Instead, it is rooted in the 
principle that “a thief cannot receive from himself.”30  As such, 
the commission of a theft necessarily excludes the possibility that 
a defendant may be convicted for receiving the same stolen 
property.31 
The amended version of section 496(a) maintains a narrow 
application of the common law, permitting a “thief in fact” to be 
convicted of receiving stolen property, but only if he or she is not 
convicted of the theft.32  The court noted, however, that the bar 
against dual convictions does not consider which offense is 
greater and which is lesser.33  Relying on the explanation given 
in Stewart, the court quoted: 
[T]heft or theft-related offenses and receiving stolen property are not 
mutually exclusive offenses; it is the theft or theft-related offense 
which has the preclusive effect.  Thus, if the defendant is found to be 
the thief he cannot be convicted of receiving the same property, and 
where he is so convicted it is the receiving conviction which is 
improper.  For this reason it is always the receiving conviction which 
cannot stand, regardless whether it is the lesser or the greater 
offense.34 
The Attorney General argued that Stewart was inapplicable 
to the present case because it applied the broader form of the 
common law rule, which would have allowed evidence of theft to 
serve as a bar against a conviction for receiving stolen property.35  
The court disagreed by clarifying and emphasizing the accuracy 
of the holding of Stewart, which dealt with an improper dual 
conviction, not mere evidence of theft.36  The court in the instant 
case expressly approved of the Stewart court’s analysis of the 
 
 27 Id. (citing People v. Medina, 161 P.3d 187, 197 (Cal. 2007)). 
 28 Id. (citing In re Greg F., 159 Cal. App. 3d 466, 469 (1984)). 
 29 Id. at 998. 
 30 Id. (quoting People v. Stewart, 185 Cal. App. 3d 197, 204 (1986)). 
 31 Id. (citing People v. Allen, 984 P.2d 486, 489–90 (Cal. 1999); People v. Jaramillo, 
548 P.2d 706, 710 (Cal. 1976); Stewart, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 206).  The court noted that 
there is an exception to this rule when there was “complete divorcement between the theft 
and a subsequent receiving . . . in a transaction separate from the original theft,” as well 
as in cases of conspiracy between the thief and the individual receiving the stolen 
property. Id. at 998 n.5 (quoting Jaramillo, 548 P.2d at 710 n.8). 
 32 Id. at 998. 
 33 Id. at 998–99. 
 34 Id. at 999 (quoting Stewart, 185 Cal. App. 3d at 209). 
 35 Id. at 999. 
 36 Id. 
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common law rationale for upholding the theft conviction, but not 
the receiving stolen property conviction.37  The court noted that 
although the rationale stemmed from the concept that a thief 
could not be convicted of receiving the same stolen property, this 
very reasoning—even after the codification of the narrower form 
of the common law rule—has guided the courts in ascertaining 
which conviction takes precedence.38 
The Attorney General further contended that allowing the 
court to impose the longer sentence of either theft or receiving 
stolen property would serve the same interests as the rule 
governing greater and lesser included offenses.39  In effect, it was 
argued, it would “provid[e] the jury with ‘a choice from the full 
range of crimes established by the evidence’ and ‘assur[e] that 
the defendant is convicted of the greatest crime a jury believes he 
committed.’”40  The Attorney General asserted that a contrary 
rule would discourage prosecutors from charging the defendant 
with both the theft and receiving stolen property, but would 
instead encourage them to charge only for the crime carrying the 
larger possible sentence.41  The court rejected this argument, 
stating that it is the legislature, through section 496(a) that 
limits the jury to choose only one conviction.42  The legislature 
has given discretion to the prosecutor to decide whether theft or 
receiving stolen property is the greater or the lesser crime, as the 
prosecutor generally has the option to charge receiving stolen 
property as either a misdemeanor or a felony.43  Moreover, the 
prosecutor can ultimately decide which offenses it wants to 
charge the defendant with.44  Generally, courts do not supervise 
these “purely prosecutorial function[s].”45 
Next, to support the contention that the rule should favor 
whichever conviction carries a more severe punishment, the 
Attorney General pointed to Penal Code section 654, which calls 
for the imposition of the longest possible sentence for an offense 
when a crime is punishable in multiple ways.46  The court 
distinguished the application of this rule by explaining that, 
while section 654 “presumes multiple convictions but precludes 
multiple punishments,” section 496(a) “precludes multiple 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a)). 
 44 Id. at 999. 
 45 Id. (quoting People v. Adams, 43 Cal. App. 3d 697, 707 (1974)). 
 46 Id. at 999. 
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convictions, therefore making multiple punishments 
impossible.”47  The court noted that this provision of section 654 
was an addition by the legislature in response to a judicial 
determination that gave deference to trial courts to choose a 
lesser sentence.48  This amendment was intended to ensure that 
punishment was proportionate to the crime, and thus prevent the 
possibility that a defendant may receive a lesser sentence 
because he or she had been convicted of two crimes instead of 
one.49 
The Attorney General then argued that the outcome would 
be precisely the one the legislature was trying to avoid if the 
courts were to allow a defendant to escape liability for a felony 
offense of receiving stolen property just because he or she was 
also convicted for misdemeanor petty theft.50  However, the court 
again emphasized that, when it came to theft coupled with 
receiving stolen property, the problem was not with choosing the 
appropriate sentence, but rather with the prohibition against 
dual convictions clearly established by section 496(a).51  The 
court again emphasized that, unlike section 654, section 496(a) 
simply does not allow for a choice in sentencing.52  The statutory 
bar against convictions for both theft and receiving the same 
stolen property was created not because of sentencing concerns, 
but rather because of the practical problems involved with the 
prosecution of the receiving stolen property offenses.53  The court 
further noted that, in its amendments to the Penal Code, the 
legislature was aware of the common law rule that a theft 
conviction must preclude a conviction for receiving the same 
stolen property.54 
The Attorney General cited People v. Black, where “the 
defendant was convicted for stealing and receiving for the same 
truck.”55  The Black court stated that, for the sake of judicial 
economy, reviewing courts have reversed the lesser conviction 
 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. (citing People v. Kramer, 59 P.3d 738, 738–39 (Cal. 2002)). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 999–1000. 
 52 Id. at 1000. 
 53 Id. (citing People v. Allen, 984 P.2d 486, 491–95 (Cal. 1999)). 
 54 Id. at 1000.  A legislative committee assessment of the 1992 amendment to section 
496(a) shows an agreement with the holding of People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1991), 
and notes: “[T]he bill permits a person who steals property to be convicted of receiving or 
concealing the same property only in those cases where there is no conviction for the theft 
of the property.” Id. at 1000 n.7 (quoting Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. 
Bill No. 332 (1991–1993 Reg. Sess.) for hearing Mar. 24, 1992, p.2).  The legislature’s 
concern was with making sure that a defendant may still be prosecuted for receiving 
stolen property even after the statute of limitations has run for the theft charge. Id. 
 55 Id. at 1000 (citing People v. Black, 222 Cal. App. 3d 523 (1990)). 
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and allowed the greater conviction to stand.56  However, the court 
here noted that this assertion in Black was mere dicta and was 
based on the “erroneous notion that ‘[t]he rule against twin-
convictions announced in Jaramillo is based on Penal Code 
section 654.’”57  Once again, the court emphasized that the rule at 
issue here, section 496(a), is entirely distinct from the prohibition 
against double punishment in section 654.58 
When faced with a similar issue, both before and after the 
amendment to section 496(a), the majority of California courts 
have reversed the conviction for receiving stolen property and 
allowed the conviction for theft to stand.59  The Court noted that 
“[t]his practice was well established when section 496(a) was 
amended in 1992, and the legislature gave no indication that a 
change was intended.”60  In the present case, however, the Court 
of Appeal “broke new ground” when it reversed the defendant’s 
conviction for theft in order to preserve the longer sentence 
received on the receiving stolen property conviction.61 
The court asserted that, generally, statutes should not be 
read to modify the common law, but instead should be construed 
to avoid conflicts with the common law.62  Quoting California 
Ass’n. of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Services, it 
stated: 
A statute will be construed in light of common law decisions, unless 
its language clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart 
from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning the 
particular subject matter . . . .  Accordingly, there is a presumption 
 
 56 Black, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 525. 
 57 Ceja, 229 P.3d at 1000 (quoting People v. Lawrence, 111 Cal. App. 3d 630, 640 
(1980)).  The court also noted that, in contrast to the case at bar, in both Black and 
Lawrence the conviction for receiving stolen property carried the lesser sentence, and the 
theft conviction was allowed to stand. Id. at 1000 n.8. 
 58 Id. at 1000 (citing People v. Allen, 984 P.2d 486, 492 n.6 (Cal. 1999)).  The court 
further explained that it had previously clarified this rule in Jaramillo, which held that 
the trial court erred in an attempt to comply with section 654 by staying a sentence on a 
lesser conviction (which could have been based on either theft of a vehicle or mere driving) 
and instead sentencing the defendant to the greater conviction of receiving stolen 
property. Id. (citing People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. 1976)).  This, however, 
evaded the issue as to whether the defendant could be properly convicted of both charges, 
the same error that has occurred in the present case. Id. at 1000.  Here, in an attempt to 
comply with section 654, after the defendant was convicted of both charges, the trial court 
stayed the sentence on the lesser offense. Id. 
 59 Id.  This practice has often been done “without regard to penalty, often without 
discussion, and sometimes on the People’s stipulation.” Id.  The court further noted that a 
burglary conviction does not bar a conviction on receiving stolen property, because 
burglary does not require theft. Id. at 1000 n.9. 
 60 Id. at 1000–01. 
 61 Id. at 1000. 
 62 Id. at 1001 (citing Cal. Ass’n. of Health Facilities v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 940 
P.2d 323, 331 (Cal. 1997)). 
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that a statute does not, by implication, repeal the common law.  
Repeal by implication is recognized only where there is no rational 
basis for harmonizing two potentially conflicting laws.63 
By requiring that, when charged with both theft and 
receiving the same stolen property, a defendant is only convicted 
for the theft, the terms of section 496(a) remain in harmony with 
the common law rule against dual convictions.64 
Holding 
The court reversed the Court of Appeal.65  The court held 
that if a defendant is convicted of theft, that defendant may not 
be convicted for receiving the same property.66  A contrary 
holding would be in violation of section 496(a)’s bar against dual 
convictions.67 
Legal Significance 
This decision precludes an individual from being convicted 
for receiving the same property for which he or she has been 
found to have stolen.  While there is a bar on being twice 
punished for the same offense, this holding has nothing to do 
with sentencing.  Rather, it deals with the issue that a defendant 
who has been convicted for theft necessarily could not have 
received the same property in violation of law, thus making it 
impossible for this defendant to be convicted for such a charge. 
 
 63 Cal. Ass’n. of Health Facilities, 940 P.2d at 331 (internal citations omitted). 
 64 Ceja, 229 P.3d at 1001.  The court briefly noted the defendant’s assertion that, per 
the Recio court, when a defendant is charged with both theft and receiving the same 
property, “the court should instruct the jury to determine the defendant’s guilt on the 
theft count first, and if it finds the defendant guilty of the theft count first, and if it finds 
the defendant guilty of the theft, to return the receiving verdict unsigned.” Id. (quoting 
People v. Recio, 156 Cal. App. 4th 719, 726 (2007)).  The court stated that this is the 
understood practice in federal courts. Id. (citing United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 
550 (1976)).  Though the issue of instructing juries was not before this present court, it 
agreed that when a defendant is charged with both theft and receiving stolen property, 
the juries should be instructed to reach a verdict on the theft charge first.  If the jury 
decides that the defendant is guilty on the theft charge, it therefore makes it unnecessary 
for them to consider the charge of receiving stolen property.  This practice would maintain 
consistency with this present case, promote efficiency in jury deliberations, and ensure 
application of the statutory ban on dual convictions. Id. at 1001. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
